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Abstract
Audiovisual records of a Project Mercury pilot’s activities during an orbital flight indicate that his visor was left open during reentry
and descent to the sea surface, phases of flight during which cabin pressure loss was to be mitigated by suit pressurization; however, the
suit could not have been pressurized with the visor open. Thus, for a presently unknown reason, a critical safety step—sealing the visor
and making a pressure suit integrity test before reentry—was overlooked in this flight. Later, Space Shuttle flights were carried out with
visors unsealed for much of the launch and landing phases, with the false assumption that they could be closed if the crew cabin were to
lose cabin pressure rapidly. The lessons are clear: first, spaceflight crews should be trained to seal visors for the entire launch and landing
phases; and second, procedure checklists will always be important to crewed flight, in both public and private spaceflight.
Keywords: flight safety, safety procedures, checklists, human factors, flight training, commercial space industry
1. Introduction
Checklists are used throughout the domains of aviation and astronautics and have played a large part in the superior
safety record of modern flight. When flight systems are formalized, checklists are relatively straightforward to produce, but
when technologies are being developed, checklists must change often to track varying system configurations and test
objectives. In rapidly developing projects (such as our space suit development work), checklist adherence can be difficult as
flight crews adjust to new sequences; other reasons for checklist failures include light crew fatigue, checklist illegibility,
aircrew confusion of checklist sequences and meanings, and others (Turner & Huntley, 1991).
By reviewing Project Mercury video, audio and transcript records, the authors have identified a case of a Mercury
astronaut not closing his pressure garment visor during reentry; this was a phase of flight in which ambient atmospheric
pressure (exterior to pressure cabin) was lethally low (effectively vacuum), and the pressure garment was worn precisely as
a backup in the event of pressure cabin pressure loss. This means that in this case, had a cabin pressure breach occurred, the
pressure garment would not have been able to fulfill its essential function of keeping the astronaut’s body at a
physiologically perceived safe, low altitude, in terms of both gas pressure and composition. At some point, the checklist
system here failed, as did the pilot’s situational awareness and that of the ground team who monitored his voice
transmissions closely; nobody noticed that sometime after about an hour into the roughly five-hour flight, the pilot opened
his pressure suit visor, and left it open through the reentry phase. Evidence for this is given in Section 2, and the
implications discussed in Section 3.
2. Video, Audio, and Transcript Evidence
We examined three main records of the Project Gemini MA-6 mission, also known as the flight of Mercury-Atlas 6, the
capsule being Friendship 7 (not to be confused with the Mercury-Redstone MR-3 Freedom 7 suborbital flight), flown on
20 February 1962 for three orbits. The records are summarized in Table 1 and described below. The records are the official
NASA mission flight audio transcript taken from onboard tape recorders (NASA, 1962a), the digitized audio records of
these tapes referenced to us by NASA archivists (NASA, 1962b), and the capsule footage from inside MA-6 (NASA,
1962c). In Table 1, ten columns present the bulk of the evidence for our claim. Column 1 is a line number for referencing
this document. Column 2 indicates mission elapsed time (MET) as recorded in the audio transcript, reported in NASA
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initiated’’ (p. 149). Column 3 is altitude in feet above mean
sea level (MSL) as derived from the MA-6 flight plan
(NASA, 1962d) and corroborated by altitude reports from
the pilot. Column 4 is the ambient pressure based on the
1976 U.S. Standard Atmosphere model for the reported
altitude. Column 5 reports communications from the pilot
or Capcom, evident in the video record, audio recording,
and/or audio transcript. Column 6 reports time elapsed
since beginning of the flight video (commencing roughly
30 seconds after the audio records). Column 7 indicates the
audio file used to report a given transmission and column 8
the timeline for that particular audio file. Column 9 indicates
the position (open or closed) of the pilot’s helmet visor.
Column 10 indicates the corresponding figure number in
this report.
The internal capsule footage covers most of the MA-6
flight, and certainly the reentry phase, during which the
astronaut’s visor position is nearly always visible and is
certainly visible at times when ambient external pressure
approximated vacuum. The audio transcript recorded all
comprehensible transmissions from launch to landing, and
was used to time-stamp the capsule footage, which does not
have a visible clock or other time indicator. The audio
records were used to corroborate the capsule footage and
audio transcript. In sum, it was possible to accurately indi-
cate that the astronaut’s pressure suit visor was in the open
position at phases of reentry when rapid capsule pressure
loss would have been fatal.
Where the MA-6 audio or visuals cut out—for example,
audio failures at MET 0:55:40 or change in video film at
MET 1:23:21—using the three media together allowed us
to reasonably infer helmet visor status. The three inde-
pendent records allowed unambiguous demonstration of the
helmet visor status (open or closed) at the most relevant
times, as discussed below, but some ambiguities of flight
operations, also discussed below, remain.
For familiarization with the helmet in question, Figure 1
displays the fiberglass shell, polycarbonate visor built into
the helmet of the modified Navy Mark V pressure garment.
In Figure 1a, the helmet visor is up, leaving a distinctive
black sealing ring or gasket visible around the perimeter
of the face opening; this is seen again in Figure 1b. In
Figure 2, the pilot is listening to the transmission from the
ground (row two of Table 1 at 00:04:44), ‘‘Twenty seconds
to SECO [supplementary engine cutoff].’’ At this time, the
helmet visor is clearly down, with the black sealing strip
noted in Figures 1a and 1b obscured by a metal cover visi-
ble in Figure 1a.
At MET 00:16:35 the pilot reports a cabin pressure of
5.7 psig and a suit pressure of 5.8 psig; these figures are
correct for the flight plan, indicating a cabin pressure
reduction from 14.7 psig at launch to ca 5 psig minimum
(100% oxygen) during orbit. The additional 0.1 psi in the
suit (yielding a suit pressure of 5.8 psi) at this point is
expected, reflecting the experience of our test subjects that
about 0.1 psi is a comfortable suit pressure (sometimes
referred to as ‘‘ventilation pressure’’) which keeps the suit
material slightly away from the body. This pressure in the
suit cannot be maintained with the visor open, so although
there is no video footage of this transmission, the numbers
indicate that at this point the visor was closed.
In Figure 3a, the pilot is opening the visor to take a
xylose (sugar) pill at MET 0:21:59. In Figure 3b, the pill is
being consumed, and in Figure 4 the visor is closed again,
just a few seconds after it was opened to take the sugar pill.
At MET 00:52:00, Capcom asks the pilot to confirm that
his visor is closed (line eight of Table 1); the pilot confirms
this, indicating that he was closing the visor as it had been
opened for some unreported time. At MET 01:13:09, the
pilot reports opening the visor to eat; somewhat over a
minute later, he reports having eaten (apple sauce from a
tube) and that he is again closing the helmet visor. The next
video footage pertinent to the subject of this brief is seen at
MET 04:33:09, during the deorbit burn; here (see Figure 5)
the visor is clearly open, with no metal band covering the
black sealing strip identified in other figures.
Figures 6, 7, 8, and 9—all time-stamped to altitudes
between orbit and 7,000 ft MSL—show an open visor.
Viewing the continuous video footage through this period
shows that the visor remained open though deorbit burn
and landing (NASA, 1962a).
By referencing another Mercury flight, we see in
Figure 10 that the MR-3 pilot had the helmet visor down
at 50,000 ft MSL. The helmet worn here did not differ from
that worn by the MA-6 pilot discussed in this report.
3. Discussion
Why was the helmet visor left open through the reentry
phase of the MA-6 mission? The reason might be simple
oversight; the MA-6 flight plan (NASA, 1962d) contains
numerous checklists for the flight, reentry, and pickup
phases of the mission. As described below, most do not
carry explicit instructions to close the visor before reentry.
Specifically, the flight plan checklists were:
1. BECO (booster engine cutoff; e.g. jettison emergency
tower).
2. SECO (supplemental engine cutoff; e.g. periscope
out, spot booster, report on tumbling sensations and zero-g
sensations).
3. Orbit Checklist (various switch settings, none related
to life support).
4. Control Systems Check (checking control perfor-
mance against expected performance).
5. Yaw Maneuver Check (perform a yaw maneuver,
and then stabilize all rates to zero).
6. Equipment Stowage (stowing away flashlight,
cameras, and other loose items prior to reentry).
Life support systems and the helmet visor position are
not mentioned in these lists. In the immediate pre-deorbit
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and reentry phase checklists there is also no mention of
the helmet visor or other life support matters. In Reference
List 7: Preretrosequence Checklist (NASA, 1962d, p. 80),
the items are:
1. Equipment—STOWED.
2. ControlSystem—CHECK (thruster warmup).
3. Emergency Retro sequence fuse switch—no. 1.
4. Transmit Switch—UHF.
5. Retro Man. fuse switch—no. 1.
6. Restraint Devices—CHECK.
7. Crosscheck Attitude—window/instruments/scope.
8. Time check CET.
It is only in Reference List 9, Post-Entry Checklist (p. 82)
that we see mention of the visor status: item 9 is ‘‘Astronaut
preparation for landing’’ and item 9d is disconnect visor
seal hose followed by 9e, open visor. These item 9 pro-
cedures are to be carried out after item 8, which is to check
Figure 1. MA-6 pilot wearing pressure helmet. (a) The helmet visor is open, revealing a distinctive black sealing strip around the perimeter of the face
opening (derived from a NASA image at http://www.nasa.gov/content/astronaut-john-glenn-at-cape-canaveral); this is better seen in (b), which is derived
from NASA (1962b). Images: NASA.
Figure 2. MA-6 pilot at 20 seconds to SECO, visor closed. Sealant strip
visible in Figures 1a and 1b not visible, here obscured by metal visor
perimeter strip seen in Figure 1a. Image: NASA.
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main parachute deployment visually, at an altitude of
10,000 ft MSL. Since the visor position was not listed in
these checklists, its status might not have been checked;
however, as Figure 10 indicates, other mission pilots did
not leave the visor open through descent and landing.
A possible contributing reason for this oversight might
be imprecision in terminology; while most documents
refer to the visor as a visor, the MA-6 pilot once refers to
the visor as the ‘‘faceplate’’ (at MET 00:21:59; see NASA,
1962c). Such discrepancies lead to uncertainties in our
experience, but precisely how such would play out in this
circumstance is unclear.
Quite a different reason for not sealing the visor is
possible; the pilot of this flight was told to leave the
retrorocket pack attached to his spacecraft during descent,
for a number of technical reasons beyond the scope of this
paper; the gist of the matter is that the pilot was aware of a
Figure 3. (a) MA-6 pilot opening visor ca 20 minutes into flight. (b) Pilot
consuming xylose (sugar) pill. Image: NASA.
Figure 4. MA-6 pilot closing visor after consuming xylose (sugar) pill while
in orbit with hard vacuum beyond pressurized cabin hull. Image: NASA.
Figure 5. MA-6 pilot reporting ‘‘Roger, retros are firing’’ at entry interface
(MET 04:33:09), with hard vacuum outside pressure cabin and helmet
visor open, altitude ca 360,000 ft above MSL. Image: NASA.
Figure 6. MA-6 pilot reporting ‘‘A real fireball outside’’ during reentry
(MET 04:43:47), with hard vacuum outside pressure cabin and helmet
visor open, altitude .100,000 ft above MSL. Image: NASA.
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major departure from the flight plan in this respect, and
might have suspected that his heat shield was damaged, as
was suspected by the ground team, but not communicated
to the pilot. In this case, it might be that the pilot made a
decision to leave the visor open in the event of a cabin
pressure breach, suspecting that one would attend any
destruction of the space capsule if the heat shield were
indeed damaged. The pilot has not reported on this matter
in public, and it is mentioned here only as a speculation.
Whatever the ambiguity here, it is clearly documented
that somewhere between MET 01:14:30 and 04:33:09, the
MA-6 pilot opened the pressure garment visor, after which
time he does not appear to close it again before reentry and
into reentry, and in the last few minutes of reentry. Loss of
cabin pressure—the contingency the pressure suit was worn
to protect against—throughout this period would likely
have been lethal with the visor open through the bulk of the
descent, with a time of useful consciousness anywhere above
40,000 ft above MSL measured in less than 15 seconds
(Federal Aviation Administration, n.d.). Space suit techni-
cian Jim LeBlanc was exposed to full vacuum in an accident
in December 1966; when his pressure suit dropped
instantaneously from a pressure of 3.8 psig to 2.5 psig he
recalls having no time to react to what was happening before
losing consciousness (Lewis, 2014).
4. Discussion and Conclusions
Three main conclusions derive from this investigation.
First, vigilance with correct use of terms, development of
Figure 7. MA-6 pilot reporting ‘‘My condition is good but that was a real
fireball outside, boy!’’ during reentry (MET 04:47:55), with hard vacuum
outside pressure cabin and helmet visor open, altitude ca 100,000 ft above
MSL. Image: NASA.
Figure 8. MA-6 pilot reporting ‘‘Altimeter off the peg indicating eight zero
thousand’’ during reentry (MET 04:48:07), with ,0.0 psia ambient
pressure outside pressure cabin and helmet visor open, altitude 80,000 ft
above MSL. Image: NASA.
Figure 9. MA-6 pilot reporting ‘‘…drogue [parachute] came out at
30,000…’’ during reentry (MET 04:49:20), with ‘‘only just physiologically
safe’’ ambient pressure of 4.3 psia outside pressure cabin and helmet visor
open, altitude ca 30,000 ft above MSL. Image: NASA.
Figure 10. MR-3 pilot reporting altitude of 50,000 ft above MSL during
reentry with helmet visor closed, black sealing ring obscured by metal
visor rim. Image: NASA.
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unambiguous and thorough checklists, and adherence to
these checklists are as critical to the successful operation of
pressure garments as to the operation of aerospace vehicles.
Until flight operations are entirely automated, checklists
will be an important part of aerospace operations and will
always require close attention.
Second, even with high-quality checklists, problems can
occur in the instructed use of spaceflight protective
garments. For example, while the crew of STS-107
(Columbia) could not have survived the high-altitude
breakup of the shuttle in any conceivable scenario, it is
notable that while they were wearing their ACES pressure
suits during reentry, ‘‘per nominal procedures, the crew
wearing helmets had visors up,’’ for various reasons
including that ‘‘[wearing visors down on reentry] results
in high oxygen concentrations in the cabin; gloves can
inhibit the performance of nominal tasks; and the cabin
stow/deorbit preparation timeframe is so busy that some-
times crew members do not have enough time to complete
suit-related steps prior to atmospheric entry’’ (NASA, 2008,
p. xxiv). In this case, astronauts used their suits as instructed,
but due to a design that allowed high oxygen concentration
in the crew cabin if the visor was down (sealed) on reentry,
reentry was carried out with visors open (unsealed), pre-
sumably assuming that the crew could manually lower the
visor if the cabin were perceived to lose pressure (we have
heard incidentally that this problem is being addressed in the
Orion capsule, but have not been able to verify this).
However, this is a false assumption: at even modest altitudes
for spaceflight, this is not guaranteed. In a stratospheric
balloon flight separate from Project Mercury, there is record
of a likely helmet pressure breach at .50,000 ft above MSL.
The pilot in this case was heard to exhale briefly before
losing consciousness; he was unable to make even the simple
motion of resealing the visor with an arm and hand motion
(Ryan, 2008) and, after landing in an unresponsive state he
later perished after some months in a coma. On the other
hand, in the case of STS-51L (Challenger) the crew did not
have pressure suits but did have helmets fed by shipboard
supplies of oxygen and, when the craft broke up and exposed
the cabin to the ambient atmosphere of ca 48,000 ft above
MSL, three crew were conscious long enough to activate
supplemental breathing gas flow into the helmets (though
they were not able to escape the tumbling crew cabin, and
perished on impact with the ocean) (Committee on Science
and Technology, 1986).
Table 2 places these cases in context and indicates that in
some cases, high-altitude cabin loss of pressure is poten-
tially survivable. In the case of an SR-71 high-altitude
disintegration in 1966, the pilot survived exposure to
.70,000 ft above MSL conditions of deep cold and
effective vacuum because during aircraft breakup his
pressure suit inflated to compensate for lowered ambient
pressure; this was possible because he was flying with
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Current and past SR-71 flights are carried out with some
aircraft cabin pressure (anecdotally reported as equiva-
lent to 26,000 ft above MSL, which would be of the order
of 5 psig; see Graham, 2008), but with the suit visor
closed and the suit partially pressurized. This ‘‘ventila-
tion pressure’’ of the suit makes it more comfortable to
wear (which is not a triviality) and allows the pressure
differential between suit and ambient conditions, in the case
of rapid cabin decompression, to be less than if the cabin
were flown at full pressure with the suit unpressurized. This
lowered pressure differential should decrease the likelihood
of barotrauma in the case of sudden cabin decompression.
It also allows the pilot to remain conscious and healthy
at the moment that a rapid decompression takes place, or
when a slower decompression begins to have significant
physiological effects.
Our third conclusion derives from the discussion above
and our noting that currently Soyuz crews both ascend to
orbit, and return to Earth, entirely with the suit pressurized
and the visor closed (this tradition began after the Soyuz 11
disaster) (Shayler, 2009) (see Figure 11). This is a simple
way to ensure that the pressure suit can carry out its
function of keeping the crew alive and conscious in case of
cabin loss of pressure. Flying in these phases of a mission
with the visor closed is simple enough; but as we have seen
in this paper, it will always require an up-to-date checklist,
and proper use of that checklist, to ensure flight safety.
Figure 12 shows the shuttle bailout procedure checklist. In
flight bailout (Mode 8) the crew are instructed to close and
lock their helmet visors and then activate their suit oxygen
supplies; this reiterates that shuttle ascents and descents
were made with visors open, with the expectation that they
could be closed in the event of cabin pressure loss, and that
the suit/cabin interface problem of enriching the shuttle
crew cabin with oxygen when the visor was down (sealed)
became normalized: indeed it was institutionalized by
inclusion in the checklist.
Figure 11. Space Shuttle bailout checklist and ascent image. Left: Note that if altitude is .50,000 ft above MSL, checklist indicates to CLOSE and LOCK
visor and turn on suit’s independent oxygen supply (via pulling the ‘‘Green Apple’’ handle on the oxygen supply actuator cord). ASC/134/FIN of Ascent
Checklist, STS-134. Mission Operations Directorate, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas. Right: Space Shuttle STS-135 crew opening visors
2 minutes and 11 seconds after launch, as instructed; just before launch they were instructed ‘‘Close and lock your visors and initiate O2 flow,’’ so that
visors were locked (sealed) for only about two minutes of the launch phase. Altitude at this time is ca 158,000 ft above MSL with hard vacuum outside
crew cabin, but visors are unsealed and the likelihood of closing them in case of rapid cabin pressure loss is highly variable. Images: NASA.
Figure 12. Soyuz capsule reentry, crewmember with helmet visor sealed.
Image: European Space Agency.
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In sum we recommend, both for the federal and rapidly
growing private space industries:
N Continual vetting of flight checklists.
N Flight protective garment training to highlight check-
list use.
N Pressure garment/spacecraft design integration such
that garment may be used as designed for use and not
in some other configuration.
N Standardization of flight procedures such that launch-
to-orbit and reentry are always carried out with the
helmet visor closed and the suit pressurized to a
significant fraction of the 3.5 psig operating pressure
of most launch–entry suits when breathing 100%
oxygen.
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